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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2099 
___________ 
 
YAN YAN, 
 
    Appellant 
v. 
 
FOX CHASE CANCER CENTER; HUA-YING FAN 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2:12-cv-03858) 
District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 20, 2015 
Before:  CHAGARES, KRAUSE and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 22, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Yan Yan appeals from two orders of the District Court denying her post-judgment 
motions in her employment discrimination action.  We will affirm. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Yan filed a complaint in the District Court alleging that her employers, Defendants 
Fox Chase Cancer Center (“FCCC”) and Dr. Hua-Ying Fan, discriminated against her 
based on her sex, national origin, and race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 
(“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 951.  She also alleged that the Defendants violated 
the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206, by paying her less than a male employee.  Following 
discovery, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court 
granted on September 18, 2014.  Yan filed a timely motion for reconsideration of that 
order, which the District Court denied on October 30, 2014.  Yan then filed a timely 
appeal of those orders.  The appeal was docketed in this Court at C.A. No. 14-4392. 
 Yan subsequently filed in the District Court several motions and letters 
challenging the District Court’s earlier grant of summary judgment and seeking 
miscellaneous relief relating to discovery.1  She also requested that the District Court 
impose sanctions upon the Defendants for their alleged failure to comply with a request 
for discovery that she had served upon them after final judgment had been entered in the 
                                              
1 Yan filed a motion requesting that the District Court reopen her case so that she could 
present additional documents and exhibits in support of her employment discrimination 
claims.  She also presented a letter highlighting certain documents she had filed 
previously and requesting that the District Court reconsider its decision granting 
summary judgment.  Additionally, she filed a “notice of injury claim for remedy and 
subpoena” wherein she appeared to request that the District Court direct FCCC to provide 
her with additional discovery.  Finally, she filed a motion seeking an order from the 
District Court directing the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) to 
reopen a landlord-tenant case that she commenced with the PHRC in 2013. 
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case.  In April 2015, the District Court entered two orders denying Yan’s various post-
judgment requests for relief.  This appeal followed.2 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.3  We may affirm on any basis 
supported by the record.  See Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 
n.10 (3d Cir. 1988).  Having reviewed the record, we determine that the District Court 
appropriately denied Yan’s post-judgment motions. 
 By the time that Yan filed her motions in the District Court, final judgment had 
already been entered in her case.  Because Yan did not seek relief under a specific 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, and mindful that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 
and 60 govern the opening of final judgments, we consider whether Yan was entitled to 
relief under either provision. 
 First, Yan was not entitled to relief under Rule 59(e).  Her motions, filed beyond 
the twenty-eight days provided for under the Rule, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), did not 
present any valid basis for reconsideration, see Max’s Seafood Cafe by Lou-Ann, Inc. v. 
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that reconsideration is warranted 
if a litigant shows “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of 
                                              
2 Yan has also filed in this Court motions seeking to be awarded money damages and 
costs. 
 
3 To the extent that Yan’s brief challenges either the District Court’s May 11, 2015 order 
granting summary judgment to the Defendants, or its October 30, 2014 order denying her 
reconsideration motion, we decline to review any issues with respect to those orders.  As 
mentioned, Yan filed a separate appeal of those decisions and was afforded the 
opportunity to present any arguments with respect to those orders in that appeal. 
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new evidence that was not available when the court [ruled]; or (3) the need to correct a 
clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.”) (citation omitted).  Second, 
Yan was not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) because her filings did not set forth any 
basis for granting relief under the Rule, including the catch-all provision in Rule 60(b)(6) 
that allows a court to relieve a party from a judgment for “any other reason that justifies 
relief.”  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60; see also Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 
(3d Cir. 2008).  Even construing her filings liberally, we do not discern any conceivable 
basis to reopen the judgment.4 
 Additionally, to the extent that Yan sought to challenge in her post-judgment 
filings the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendants, the District Court correctly denied relief because Rule 60(b) is not a 
substitute for an appeal.  See Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1988), overruled 
on other grounds, Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Furthermore, because final judgment had already been entered in Yan’s case, the Court 
did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant her leave to reopen the proceedings in 
order to engage in additional discovery.  Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in 
declining to reopen the case in order to impose sanctions.  See Gary v. Braddock 
Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2008).5   
                                              
4 We review the denial of Rule 60(b) relief for abuse of discretion.  See Coltec Industries, 
Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
5 We also conclude that the District Court did not err in denying Yan’s apparent motion 
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 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.  Yan’s motions 
seeking the award of money damages and costs are denied. 
                                                                                                                                                  
seeking an order directing the PHRC to reopen her administrative case.  Such a request 
did not present any grounds for reopening her District Court case.  Moreover, federal 
courts do not have ordinary oversight responsibility over state agencies like the PHRC.  
Cf. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970). 
